Abstract-Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication in cellular network is the driver for the future Internet of Things (IoT). The main challenge of M2M communication is the possibility of huge traffic in the uplink network that can cause problem in the network. This paper considers the problem of resource allocation among machines connecting in uplink to different femto base stations (FBSs). Resource allocation problem is analyzed through both non-cooperative and cooperative game to maximize their data rate and minimize utilization of power. Numerical result shows that by adapting non-cooperative game, all machines are getting data rate as per Nash Equilibrium (NE) or either they can set their strategy to maximize their data rate selfishly. On the other hand for coalitional game theory approach machines who participate in game are getting fair resource allocations.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, field of wireless communication began to discuss the in-corporation among the machines in which meters, sensors and user equipment (smart phones) are involved [1] . Large coverage of wireless cellular network gives opportunity to communicate machines. It is assumed that millions of machines will connect to the cellular network directly or indirectly in the coming future [1, 2] . Increase in numbers of machines which might be diverse in their nature is allowing industry to think about proper resource allocation and scheduling schemes to improve the network performance, which is normally not designed for M2M communication. M2M machines are using wireless uplink to communicate with base station (BS). If machine is under the coverage region of multiple BSs then it is likely to connect with the strongest or the nearest BS. In uplink communication resource allocation e.g. power is difficult to manage due to distributed power constraints of machines instead of centralized downlink communication [3] , if all the machines are battery operated then total transmission power constraint is also an important issue.
For M2M, the main objective is to minimize their transmitting power and maximize their data rate. It is really hard to dedicate resources for each machine as the number of machine are increasing by time [2] . M2M communication typically transmitting short session from huge numbers of machines [4] . Random access might be a solution for huge numbers of machines to grab resources as it is hard to dedicate resources to each machine. Furthermore, the idea of cooperative machine grouping [5] , along with a controller in between machine group and BS is discussed for energy efficient M2M communication [6] . Power efficient M2M communication system is evaluated by assigning equal distribution of minimum time and minimum bandwidth in time division multiple access (TDMA) and frequency division multiple access (FDMA) respectively [7] . Machines or a group of machines which have different data rate requirements then equal distribution of resources among them is not a fair solution. In single BS network, resources divided among machines are either by time or frequency. Furthermore, in single BS scenario, for efficient delay and channel aware resource allocation scheduling is a solution as discussed in [8] .
In this paper, we take a new direction to analyze the resource allocation problem of M2M communication under two femto base stations (FBSs) network with game theory. Recently, there has been significant research work that implements game theory for the analysis of resource allocation in wireless communication networks. This is basically due to the need for distributed mobile networks where machines can make independent and rational strategic decision [9] . Generally, game theory classified into two branches: noncooperative [10] and cooperative game theory [11] . Noncooperative game theory studies the strategic choices resulting from the interactions among competing players, where each player improving its strategy independently for improving its own performance or reducing its loss [12] . Nash equilibrium (NE) is a one of the solution for non-cooperative game. Cooperative game theory provides analytical tools to study the behavior of rational players when they cooperate make a coalition to strengthen their positions in the game [11] . Access control by using cooperative game theory in multiple base station scenario discussed in [13] by putting uplink users in two coalition.
In this paper, we modeled a network FBSs with number of machines attached in uplink. Model is evaluated under both non-cooperative game and cooperative game theory techniques separately. In non-cooperative game, resource distribution falls to NE among all machines participating in this game. As the data rate requirement of machines is different and might be NE is not a fair solution.
The rest of paper is divided into following sections: Section II the system model and assumptions are presented. Section III and IV provide the analysis of the non-cooperative game theory and the coalitional game theory analysis respectfully. The numerical result and result analysis are described in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper with future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this paper, we consider a system with two FBSs , that shares the same sub-carriers, 1, 2, … . , which consists of number of orthogonal sub-channels. Let there be 1, 2, … . , , where 2, uplink machines trying to connect with any one of the given femto base station. Any machine can use any of the sub-channels within the band to transmit its data. The channel quality is denoted by and from machines to FBS and respectively. The channel quality set for FBS is , , ,
.
. The channel quality may depend on distance, attenuation, random fading effect and antenna gain. Let us designate the transmit power of a machine , where belongs to desired signal and belongs to interfering signal, on a -th sub-channel to be and total transmit power is . The transmit power vector of machines is defined by, , , … … .
where ∑ , 0 . Thus, the carrier to noise plus interference ratio (CINR) at FBS on sub-channel is given as:
similarly, the CINR at FBS ' ' on sub-channel is given as:
Where, and are the group of machine attached to FBS and and producing interference for FBS and respectively.
The utility of each machine is taken to be the maximum rate at which it can transfer its data to respective FBS.
For FBS , ∑ log 1
similarly, for FBS ,
Perfect channel state information (CSI) is estimated by FBS dedicated machines with static in mobility and channel quality is invariant [14] .
III. NON-COOPERATIVE GAME FORMULATION
Each machine likes to maximize its data rate (utility) which causes resource allocation problem. The proposed noncooperative game model is described in Fig. 1 .
Elements of the game , are given as:
, is a set of machines as players.
2) A set of actions, denoted by is action space for all machines . Where the joint strategy profile, ∏ .
3) Payoff/utility functions for machines, denoted by : , corresponding to their actions From "(1), (2), (3) and (4)" utility of every machine under different FBS 'e' or FBS 'f' choosing action can be given as,
Hence, as every player would selfishly maximize its own utility while we desire maximal social utility, the problem can be formulated as follow:
, ,
subject to
0, ,

Definition: (Nash Equilibrium).
For the game in "(5)", the action profile , , , … . ,
is an NE for all players if and only if, , , ,
The above definition indicates that no machine can improve utility by a unilateral deviation from current actions. This implies that all other machine's actions do not change at NE thus convergence is achieved.
IV. COALITIONAL GAME FORMULATION
The non-cooperative game model can upset the machines by giving the equal resources to all machines through NE either there through put demand is different. In this section we analyzed the FBSs network by applying coalitional game setup as shown in Fig. 2 instead of distributed decision of machine as in Fig.1 . In our model which is defined as and denote the two sets of machines that have been admitted by FBSs e and f, respectively, such that and . We shall call these sets coalitions. The machines have ability to leave from one coalition to another coalition of machines to get better payoff in the form of better data rate/throughput. Coalition participated machines do not create interference for their coalitional partners due to use of unique overlapped subchannels for transmission. Interference level increase as illustrated in Fig.2 for the neighboring coalition under different FBS, same as spectrum being reused by them. Thus the action of machine is confined to just two moves either join coalition or joins . Machines are accepted or rejected in coalition based on their payoff requirements and impact of their participation in coalition on other members and other coalition. If all machines are with same rate requirements then resources can be distributed equally within the available resources. We assumed that rate requirement of machines are not same and for fair resource allocation among machines bankruptcy game is used. The system model based on cooperative game
A. Non-cooperative Game within coalition game
It is mentioned above that machines have ability to leave from one coalition to another coalition of machines to get better payoff in the form of better data rate/throughput. Changing in the coalitions by the numbers and types of machines also changes the worth of its own and its complimented coalition. Worth of coalition is the requirement to solve bankruptcy game under coalition game. It is necessary to find the worth of each coalition which is also called characteristic function or self-value ( ) by considering each coalition as a player of non-cooperative game as in Fig. 2 Bankruptcy game used to solve the fair resource allocation among the collated members. The worth of each coalition be the maximum sum of payoffs that it can achieve for its members which is shown in [15] as for coalition is max ∑ and also the minimizing factor from the other coalition as interfering power min ∑ . Characteristic equation to find value function is shown below likely to be same as represented in [13] with some modification as per requirement on constraints.
, subject to
, subject to , 0 log 1 , By applying Lagrange multiplier technique, we can write associated value of the coalition as (see Appendix A,)
Similarly, the compliment of above value,
B. Coalitional Game Formulation
In our proposed model, we investigate the uplink resource allocation in the context of -person coalitional game. Aim is to guarantee the rate requirement of the machines in a fair manner. Each machine has different rate requirements and subcarriers have different conditions. Coalition among the machines helps to achieve rate requirements of each machine while minimizing the power. Bankruptcy game is a special type of n-persons coalitional game, to obtain the solution of the resource allocation problem within the coalition.
C. Bankruptcy Game
This game is modeled as the pair , , where is the set of machines (players) and is a real valued function or characteristic function of the game or also called self-value of the game. The self-value ( ) depends upon the resources available to be distributed among the players. No player can get more than he claimed or less than zero and that the total resources are divided among the players. We choose Shapley value for the solution of fair resource allocation problem. Particularly, the payoff of each machine in a coalition is determined by the Shapley value, which provides a fair distribution of payoff among the machines. Shapley value calculation requires evaluation of every possible combination of the coalitions , .
D. Self-Value ( )
In [12] and our proposed model, is a real valued function of the game satisfying the following conditions: 1) 0 2) Super-additivity, let and are two disjoint coalition , then . [12] The quantity considered as worth of coalition is guaranteed to obtain payoff without any external assistance.
E. Shapley Value
In [16, 17] , Shapley proposed a solution concept, known as the Shapley value , to assign a unique payoff value to each player in the -persons coalitional game. Following are the axioms of fairness.
1) (Symmetry) If player and player are interchangeable in , i.e., for every coalition that does not contain player and player , then . 2) (Dummy player) If player is a dummy in , i.e., for every coalition , then 0.
3) (Additivity) For any two games and , define the game by , then for all . 4) (Efficiency) ∑ .
The Shapley value function which satisfies above all axioms is given by:
F. Steps of Proposed Algorithm 1) Calculate the self-value ( ) of coalition based on the channel gain and the available power by using noncooperative game theory as in "(10)" and "(11)".
2) After self-value of coalition calculates payoff for the machines by using bankruptcy game.
3) Shapley value can calculate the share of resources in fair manner among the machines as in " (14)".
4)
Calculation continues as new machine enter or leave coalition, which will affect the self-value and payoff.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We evaluate the performance of two FBS and four machines, 1,2,3,4 , both sharing the same channels of total 100 at bandwidth, 180 . Total maximum transmit power, 1 and spectral noise density, 10 11 / is assumed. We assumed Rayleigh channel quality.
For non-cooperative game as illustrated in " (5)" is played. Plotted in Fig. 3 which shows the NE point and machines individual data requirement, if all players choose same strategy which converge to a same point then this point is NE. If players choose their own strategy to maximize their data rate (payoff) selfishly affect the system performance by producing congestion or interference in system. NE is giving optimum result by equal distribution of resources. If players are getting NE, it is not necessary that they are achieving fairness too as different machines has different data rate requirements and NE is giving same data rate for all players. This problem can be resolved by applying coalitional game theory in which Shapley value provides us the fair distribution of the resources as per the players participating coalition.
For coalitional game, the characteristic value of coalitions from "(12)" and " (13) " are due to their members. If there is no member in coalition then its characteristic value is zero. So members participating are directly affecting the characteristic values which further affecting the Shapley value. In our model two coalitions are controlled by two FBS. Individual data rate of = 4 players at = 100
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have modeled uplink M2M communication network and discussed resource allocation problem and their solution by applying non-cooperative and cooperative game theory approaches. Non-cooperative game theory helps machine to adapt strategy for better payoff without cooperation of others, which returns to machine either to grab maximum resources selfishly or converge to Nash Equilibrium. We observed that if machines are with different payoff requirement then NE is not a fair solution. Coalition game theory helps to make the fair distribution of resources with the Also, since a sub-channel is assigned to a single machine in , the strategy of th machine is would be 1 2
1
Same as for coalition , as it is complimentary of .
